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RE SPONSE
THE SIGNALING MODEL OF SOCIAL NORMS:
FURTHER THOUGHTS
Eric A. Posner*
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the most notable trends in legal scholarship is the ex-
plosion of writing on social norms. Just a few years ago one might
have argued that the scholarship was marginal, of interest to only
a handful of law professors, but expressions of skepticism about
the value of this scholarship have become rare. At the same time,
it would be wrong to say that "law and social norms" ("LSN") is a
movement or school within legal scholarship: the writings about
this topic are too diverse, and there is little of that sense of for-
ward movement that is characteristic of more established schools
such as law and economics. The problem is a lack so far of coher-
ent organizing principles for mastering and rendering usable a
highly fragmented body of writings. If such principles are not de-
veloped, one fears that the literature will eventually collapse un-
der its own weight, leaving scattered insights but no real wisdom.
In my view the best hope for avoiding this outcome lies in the
absorption of LSN research into law and economics, and, further,
in the emergence of a consensus within law and economics on the
appropriate method for modeling or thinking about social norms.
* Professor of Law, University of Chicago. Thanks to the Sarah Scaife Foundation
Fund and the Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundation Fund for generous financial support.
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For support for this claim one need look no farther than recent
intellectual history. As critics do not tire of reminding us, legal
scholars had heard of social norms, and written about them, long
ago. Stewart Macaulay's 1963 article on norms governing com-
mercial relationships launched an early boom of academic writing
on social norms.' That boom turned into a bust, however, and
persists in the form of interesting but static and marginal Law
and Society empirical scholarship on commercial behavior. The
current enthusiasm for LSN derives from Robert Ellickson's 1991
book,2 which was written in the spirit of economics though he also
criticizes aspects of the discipline, and, I think, from conference
papers on "Law, Economics, & Norms" that appeared in the Uni-
versity of Pennsylvania Law Review in 1996.' It was the infusion
of economics into a moribund subject that created the current en-
thusiasm for law and social norms.
Ellickson's book, as I mentioned, expresses some ambivalence
about whether economics possesses the tools necessary for ex-
plaining social norms. On the one hand, in explaining how social
norms operate, and in justifying his thesis that close-knit social
norms are welfare-maximizing, he appeals to repeated game sto-
ries of cooperation. On the other hand, he also suggests that cog-
nitive biases might play a role. But the latter idea has had little
influence. The source of the book's influence is, I think, the con-
necting up of the problem of social norms-how they work,
whether they influence behavior, whether they are good or
bad-and concerns that were central to, and had been highlighted
by, law and economics, such as whether legal rules influence the
efficiency of behavior (the Coase idea), and whether people obey
the law or even know about it. The empirical work of the book
also explains some of its influence but empirical work on the rela-
tionship between law and social norms was not new; what was
new was the use of empirical data to test an idea about social
norms within an economic framework.
Since Ellickson wrote his book, authors writing from the eco-
nomic perspective have proposed a number of approaches to LSN.
1. Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study,
28 AM. Soc. REV. 55 (1963).
2. ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: How NEIGHBORS SETLE DISPUTES
(1991).
3. Symposium, Law, Economics, & Norms, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1643 (1996).
THE SIGNALING MODEL OF SOCIAL NORMS
Some of these authors, like Ellickson, treat social norms as de-
scriptions of behavioral regularities that exist in an equilibrium
in which people pursue their rational self-interest. Others treat
social norms as though they were preferences held by individuals.
I prefer the former approach, and in my book I argued that the
most useful model of social norms is the signaling model-or,
more precisely, the cluster of models that analyze behavior when
individuals have private information.' The goal is to be able to
explain ordinary social behavior that is said to be driven by a de-
sire to comply with social norms, to predict the effect of legal
changes on this behavior, and to justify particular legal reforms
in light of these predictions. The most interesting question, in my
view, is whether laws that have straightforward justifications
from a traditional economic perspective might turn out to have
perverse or surprising effects once social norms are taken into ac-
count. This question connects to many other debates about the re-
lationship between law, legalism, rights, and the state, on the one
hand, and community, social capital, and private initiative, on the
other.
I should make clear something that has escaped some critics,
which is that I have never argued that signaling is the sole ex-
planation for social norms. It is simply a hypothesis, for which
there is some suggestive evidence, but in any event it is not likely
to explain all social norms.5 The question is whether it explains
enough of such behavior that proposals of legal reform where so-
cial norms matter should involve consideration of problems of
asymmetric information.6
Now let me turn to the comments.
II. MALLEABILITY OF THE THEORY
Kahan and Mahoney fear that the signaling theory explains too
much, and cannot be falsified. Kahan argues that if any action,
whether cheap or costly, can be a signal, then "the signaling
4. I have also come to think that herd behavior models might be useful.
5. See ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS ch. 3 (2000).
6. I thank several readers who pointed out a mix-up in the use of the words "high"
and "low" to refer to discount rates on pages 29, 34, 36, and 37 of the hardcover edition of
Law and Social Norms. These errors have been corrected in the paperback edition.
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model can be used to tell whatever story the modeler wants."7
Mahoney expresses a similar worry about the claim that different
groups-in his example, bankers and protestors-use different
signals.' A simpler theory, in which only costly actions served as
signals and everyone cared about the views of everyone else,
would be less subject to manipulation.
Neither of the concerns raised by Kahan and Mahoney render
the signaling theory malleable or non-falsifiable, though they do
render it complex. The actions to which Kahan refers are cheap
only in the intrinsic sense, but are costly in the model because
they provoke sanctions from others. Thus, in testing an argument
about a relatively cheap signal (like wearing a tie on a hot day),
we need to specify the conditions under which this action is likely
to provoke sanctions (an employee whose boss cares about dress)
or not (a person who is out touring). As to Mahoney's concern, in
testing the signaling theory one needs to keep track of the type of
person with whom the subject can earn returns from a coopera-
tive relationship. Bankers do not cooperate with globalization
protestors; they do cooperate with each other.
Indeed, as Kahan points out, and as I pointed out in the article,
Kahan purports to critique,9 the signaling story does have trouble
with tax compliance behavior in the United States because the
reputational sanction is bounded by restrictions on public release
of tax compliance information. Kahan cannot at the same time
say that the signaling story is non-falsifiable and that it is falsi-
fied.
The signaling idea does not deviate from the premises of ra-
tional choice; and while it does introduce some indeterminacy, the
indeterminacy can be cabined through careful empirical study, as
I have explained. By contrast, Kahan's reciprocation idea faces
more formidable hurdles. Kahan does not explain how reciproca-
tion would work: for example, whether a taxpayer conceives of
himself reciprocating the behavior of all other taxpayers, or only
those in his community or state; whether (and why) a taxpayer
7. Dan M. Kahan, Signaling or Reciprocating? A Response to Eric Posner's Law and
Social Norms, 36 U. RICH. L. REV. 367, 373 (2002).
8. Paul G. Mahoney, Norms and Signals: Some Skeptical Observations, 36 U. RICH.
L. REV. 387, 393-94 (2002).
9. Eric A. Posner, Law and Social Norms: The Case of Tax Compliance, 86 VA. L.
REV. 1781, 1807 (2000).
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reciprocates the tax compliance of others by paying taxes himself
rather than doing something else like making charitable contri-
butions or volunteering for public service; and whether (and why)
a person when deciding to reciprocate by paying taxes would not
look at all other taxpaying behavior or all other behavior period,
including, say, the extent to which other people refrain from lit-
tering or volunteer for charitable activities.
The problem is that Kahan provides no theory that explains
the reference group to whom one reciprocates. Any effort to do so
would be open to accusations of manipulation, as when he sug-
gests that Minnesota taxpayers only reciprocate along the dimen-
sion of tax compliance, and only with respect to other Minnesota
residents, rather than along other dimensions, and with respect
to a larger or smaller group, in which case the normative implica-
tions of the case study become obscure.'
In sum, Kahan's reciprocity theory seems, as far as I can tell, to
rely on an implicit rational actor model with the reciprocity urge
or preference tacked on. By contrast, the signaling theory relies
only on the rational actor model. The extra degree of freedom in
Kahan's theory makes it more malleable, not less. Still, my point
here is not to criticize Kahan's theory for being too malleable; it is
to criticize his and Mahoney's assumption that only the very sim-
plest theories can be tested. As Schaefer points out, simplicity is
not the only criterion for a good theory, and indeed he criticizes
the signaling theory for being too simple, not too complex!"
III. SCOPE OF THE THEORY
Schaefer correctly points out that people send signals to reveal
information about other characteristics aside from discount
rate. 2 Although my book acknowledges this possibility in a foot-
note, 3 it was not sufficiently emphasized, and Schaefer's discus-
sion is a useful corrective. He also makes interesting points about
the problem of insincerity: if people attend church in order to sig-
nal their type, then others might suspect them of insincerity.'4 Al-
10. Kahan, supra note 7, at 380.
11. Elmer J. Schaefer, Predicting Defection, 36 U. RICH. L. REV. 443, 461 (2002).
12. Id. at 445-46.
13. POSNER, supra note 5, at 225 n.3.
14. Schaefer, supra note 11, at 454.
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though Schaefer might mean this argument as a critique, I think
it captures an essential characteristic of social norms, namely,
that obedience to social norms involves a kind of hypocrisy.
Law professors find this idea shocking-they prefer to take
people very seriously and earnestly credit the commonplace view
that social norms are an integral part of human identity. Perhaps
so, but there is a contrary intellectual tradition that sees the
comedy in human behavior, and, in particular, in the contrast be-
tween human motives and the arbitrary social norms that people
purport to respect, but in fact obey only when it serves their self-
interest. 5 Although this tradition tends to assume that ordinary
people are fooled by their own narratives-and that only artists,
academics, and swindlers have a clear view of the conflict be-
tween human motives and the stories people tell-I want to avoid
these complicated psychological questions and merely observe
that the signaling idea fits into this tradition and introduces a
useful perspective on it.
Schaefer revels in the complexity of human behavior, and de-
lights in describing the psychological games that everyone must
play with himself. He is right that self-mastery, self-discipline,
the ability to defer gratification, far-sightedness, and related con-
cepts have subtle variations in meaning, and call for different
psychological and social responses, but, as I noted above, there
are methodological returns to stripping down the complexity of
the social and psychological worlds to their essentials.
Mahoney argues that signaling theory does not apply to the
norms that arise in families. 6 However, we know from empirical
work that marriage frequently ends in divorce, and we know from
personal experience, literature, and academic studies that mari-
tal relationships are pervaded with betrayal, shirking, and un-
fairness. Courtship rituals and the initial exchange of marriage
vows are best understood to be mutual signaling, and the rituals
of marital life-exchanges of gifts, for example-are, I think, hard
to understand as something different from signaling private in-
formation: maybe not discount rate exactly or entirely, but re-
15. See, e.g., PETER L. BERGER, THE PRECARIOUS VISION: A SOCIOLOGIST LOOKS AT
SOCIAL FICTIONS AND CHRISTIAN FAITH (Greenwood Press 1976) (1961).
16. Mahoney, supra note 8, at 391.
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lated factors such as the relative attractiveness of outside oppor-
tunities.
I also disagree with Mahoney's suggestion that signaling occurs
only at the margin.17 A wealthy person has an incentive to signal
as long as he wants to become wealthier, or wants to procure
other gains that depend on trust (such as a political career). The
only person who would not bother to signal is someone who is so
thoroughly despised and degraded that no one would trust him
whatever he did; or someone who has so consistently demon-
strated his trustworthiness that doubts about his time prefer-
ences are extinguished. And I would expect that both types of
people would expend a smaller fraction of their resources in sig-
naling than others would. Very wealthy and successful people
famously flout social norms; so do the miserably poor. But even
these people comply sometimes: the mighty fall, and the fallen
are redeemed; and the rest of us, knowing this, are willing to up-
date our beliefs in light of additional information.
Finally, Mahoney seems to think that the existence of gos-
sip-because it is "haphazard and unreliable"-poses an objection
to the signaling theory. He says that information is too valuable
to be left to such a mechanism of transmission, and indeed we see
in the credit market a more systematic effort to collect and
transmit information in the form of credit agencies. But I do not
understand the force of this example. As he observes, much sig-
naling reveals low-value information (X is a good handyman) and
one would not expect sophisticated market mechanisms to be de-
veloped to exploit it; gossip is just a word for people exchanging
such information informally. But because it is informal, it is often
unreliable, though not absolutely worthless. Mahoney says that
he would be embarrassed to sell information about a business
contact who gives him a thoughtful gift,"8 and this is indeed an
interesting phenomenon that I discuss in chapter eleven of the
book; but for present purposes it is sufficient to observe that the
information is valuable, and another person would benefit from
acquiring it, and indeed the business contact would benefit if oth-
ers acquired it.
17. Id. at 394.
18. Id. at 395.
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IV. SOCIAL NORMS VERSUS COOPERATIVE BEHAVIOR AND
COLLECTIVE ACTION
Kahan argues that my "model is inconsistent with a wealth of
empirical data on how individuals actually do behave in collective
action settings." 9 He refers mainly to experimental studies in
which people deviate from Nash equilibrium strategies. Scholars
have struggled for many years to find explanations for this behav-
ior-Kahan's reciprocity norm is but one of many proposals;
Schaefer's essay discusses others.2" I have never denied, however,
that people deviate from the rational actor paradigm. My claim is,
rather, that discount rate refers to central characteristics about
which people have private information of importance to others
who want to cooperate with them, and that people will signal in
order to reveal this information, resulting in behavior that is de-
scribed as a social norm. This theory is compatible with emotions
and cognitive biases influencing behavior in general; it is in ten-
sion only with comprehensive emotion-based or cognitive theories
for compliance with social norms.
Kahan misconceives my project if he thinks, as he seems to,
that I am trying to explain how groups of people cooperate in or-
der to produce collective goods. The source of his confusion might
be Ellickson's theory, which also conflates two separate phenom-
ena--compliance with social norms (which might or might not
contribute to the production of collective goods) and cooperative
behavior directly concerned with the production of collective
goods.
Rock and Wachter, by contrast, understand this distinction.
They recognize that their theory is about the cooperation side of
behavior, not the social norm side of behavior.2 In my book, I ar-
gued that it is useful to divide social interaction into two concep-
tual stages: the signaling stage and the cooperation stage. It was
in the signaling stage that social norms were located: signals, I
argued, form social norms. As for the cooperation stage, I argued
that the usual repeated game story can explain bilateral or small-
19. Kahan, supra note 7, at 375.
20. See generally Schaefer, supra note 11.
21. Edward Rock & Michael Wachter, Meeting by Signals, Playing by Norms: Com-
plementary Accounts of Nonlegal Cooperation in Institutions, 36 U. RICH. L. REV. 423
(2002).
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number cooperation, and it is not useful to think of the equilib-
rium cooperative behavior as itself conforming with social norms.
The word, "social norm," is ambiguous, and Rock and Wachter
use it more broadly than I do to refer to the behavioral regulari-
ties that arise when individuals cooperate. 22  Individu-
als-including employers and employees-have an incentive to
try to agree on actions that maximize their joint surplus: Rock
and Wachter call those actions "social norms." They correctly con-
trast these social norms with the kind of norms that the signaling
theory explains. There is no need to get into a semantic debate
about whether social norms should be defined broadly or nar-
rowly. But the distinction between the two types of actions-one
motivated by a desire to reveal information about oneself, the
other by a desire to elicit a cooperative response even in a game of
complete information-is important.
V. SOCIAL NORMS VERSUS MARKET OUTCOMES
There is a related point about the difference between social
norms as signaling equilibria, and social norms as market out-
comes. Hetcher's comment illustrates this difference.23
One strand of Hetcher's analysis-focusing on the "norms" of
Web site privacy-is interesting but unremarkable, and has little
to do with the kind of social norms at the center of the LSN lit-
erature. Hetcher observes that different Web sites have different
privacy policies, the result of tremendous experimentation, but
that the policies are beginning to converge. What he does not
stress, but what is clear from his discussion, is that the firms that
operate these Web sites face straightforward, albeit difficult,
questions about how to balance the costs and benefits of different
privacy policies. Protecting privacy is costly-both because the
Web site must be made more complex and must include safe-
guards, and because the owner of the Web site loses its ability to
exploit the economic value of the information. But protecting pri-
vacy is necessary to the extent that customers who care about
their privacy might go elsewhere. The owners of the Web sites
understand that some users care about privacy more than others,
22. Id. at 435.
23. Steven A. Hetcher, Cyberian Signals, 36 U. RICH. L. REV. 327 (2002).
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and so include opt out or opt in mechanisms, but these add com-
plexity, and so might not be worth the cost.
I say that this analysis is unremarkable because similar things
can be said about a car manufacturer's evaluation of different ve-
hicle designs or, more apt, a television network's evaluation of a
program or series. In both cases, the producer needs to take ac-
count of the heterogeneity of demand (different people want the
product to have different characteristics) and the costs of meeting
this demand. At one extreme, the producer manufactures a stan-
dard product, which is cheap but will fail to attract customers
with idiosyncratic tastes. At the other extreme, the producer
manufacturers a product that can be modified to suit the cus-
tomer's wishes; the product will be expensive but will attract
marginal customers. The choice depends on the technology of
production, the variation in demand, and so forth. We would ex-
pect that as a market develops a producer will experiment with
different levels of heterogeneity in its product, in an effort to fig-
ure out how much people with outlying preferences are willing to
pay for a product that is tailored to their desires. This is what
seems to be occurring among Web sites. But I do not see the rea-
son for thinking about this behavior through the lens of LSN; it is
simply ordinary market behavior.
The other strand of Hetcher's analysis focuses on a more inter-
esting and difficult question. He points out that Web customers
are not just irritated by Web sites that violate their privacy, the
way one might be irritated by a car that does not have enough
head room or does not come in an attractive color. People are of-
fended when a Web site violates their privacy, and they complain
bitterly, and often make an effort, at their own cost, to sanction
the Web site's owner.
The existence of offense, and the willingness to incur costs in
order to sanction others who offend, is always a sign of a social
norm at work, and Hetcher is right to say that there are social
norms of privacy that go beyond the characteristic of the Web site
"product." It is not clear to me, however, that the social norms of
privacy in cyberspace differ interestingly from the social norms of
privacy that exist everywhere else. As to those norms, much can
be said and I do not have space here to expand on what I say in
the book. I do think that privacy norms reflect the basic signaling
story. A person can gain-in many ways-by acquiring informa-
tion about another person's tastes, experiences, and time prefer-
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ence. Respect for privacy-the deliberate refusal to acquire such
information, or to disseminate information that has been ac-
quired-is a costly signal, and so can distinguish people by type.
We respect people who are discreet (even though it annoys us
that we cannot obtain information from them) and we do not re-
spect people who are indiscreet (even though we take advantage
of their indiscretion), because discretion reflects an aspect of
character that we value, namely time preference and similar co-
operative virtues.
VI. COGNITIVE BIASES AND OTHER DEVIATIONS FROM
RATIONAL CHOICE
Our social norm antennae are activated when we observe peo-
ple acting in a way that does not seem to be driven by self-
interest-throwing out garbage rather than littering, wearing
high heels rather than comfortable shoes, paying taxes when
cheating is hard to detect. The field of cognitive psychology also
takes this domain as its topic, arguing that cognitive biases ac-
count for non-self-interested behavior. A question thus arises
about the relationship between these phenomena.
One possibility, which I prefer, is that the fields are related but
not coextensive. Cognitive biases might explain lots of behavior,
or not, but they do not provide a good account for conformity with
social norms. For example, a person who fails to purchase insur-
ance because he underestimates low probability events might suf-
fer from a cognitive bias or not, but it would not be useful to de-
scribe this behavior as a social norm.24
Schaefer and Kahan take a different tack, arguing that social
norms reflect cognitive phenomena. Kahan, as I have argued
above, confuses cooperation and norm compliance: even if there is
an intrinsic (cognitive or emotional) "preference" to reciprocate,
and even if this preference results in cooperation in some do-
mains, it does not follow that this preference results in compli-
ance with a social norm like resting on Sundays. Schaefer's inter-
esting claims about self-mastery are also, I think, a topic distinct
24. Of course, there can be norms against purchasing insurance. VIVIANA A. ZELIZER,
PRICING THE PRICELESS CHILD: THE CHANGING SOCIAL VALUE OF CHILDEN (1985). Her dis-
cussion makes clear that the norm against insuring the life of one's child was due to social,
not cognitive, influences. See id. at 113-37.
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from that of social norms. That is not to say there is no relation-
ship; indeed, a person who exercises self-mastery will want to
signal this information, and this might result in behavior consis-
tent with social norms, but for analytic purposes we should dis-
tinguish the psychological mechanism that interests Schaefer and
the social mechanism described by the signaling theory.
I should observe parenthetically that Schaefer and Kahan are
correct to point out that the concept of time preference is complex
and that it seems implausible to say that an individual has a sin-
gle discount rate that applies to all the different kinds of rewards
for which he might have a preference. But it is a useful simplifi-
cation for expository purposes-it is particularly apt when the
rewards are monetary-and Kahan goes too far when he claims
that the concept of discount rate is not coherent. 25 The literature
to which he appeals shows, among many other things, that people
do not discount at a constant rate and that they do not discount
large sums at the same rate that they discount small sums. 26 But
there is ample evidence that discounting does occur, and that is
all that the signaling story requires. When an individual decides
whether to cooperate with another person, he must make a judg-
ment about the latter's time preference about the reward that the
latter person would obtain through cooperation. As long as the
person's time preferences are loosely correlated, the signaling
theory makes sense.
Kahan also criticizes what he calls the "correlation of zealotry
with materialist values,"27 arguing that "[casual observation fur-
nishes little reason to believe that those who submit to virulent
frenzies of intolerance end up with the greatest business oppor-
tunities."28 But here Kahan is just indulging in some wishful
thinking about the psychology of intolerance. Not all intolerant
behavior is "frenzied"; much of it is rational and opportunistic. Al-
though the sadists and the crazies receive the attention of the
25. Kahan, supra note 7, at 374.
26. See Shane Frederick, George Loewenstein & Ted O'Donoghue, Time Discounting
and Time Preference: A Critical Review, J. ECON. LITERATURE (forthcoming 2002). I could
find no suggestion in this paper that "the degree to which individuals are willing to sacri-
fice present gains for future ones is governed by social norms." Kahan, supra note 7, at
374. On the contrary, the authors generally explain time preferences by appealing to psy-
chological mechanisms, including sophistication, habit-formation, reliance on reference
points, emotion, and mental accounting.
27. Kahan, supra note 7, at 373.
28. Id.
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media, sophisticated observers have always understood that, ex-
cept in moments of great crisis, the quiet opportunism of ordinary
people-the merchants in the Jim Crow South, the civilians in
Serbia-create the opportunities for the zealots. Virulent frenzies
of intolerance are not instances of rational signaling, and they are
not usefully understood as norm-governed behavior. Throughout
the book, I put aside emotional behavior because it is not well
enough understood to be the basis of a theory of social norms.
Meares also rejects the rational choice approach, preferring to
base criminal law policy on psychological theories of human be-
havior. I do not know whether the theories she describes are
plausible and whether they really justify the dubious-sounding
practice of "restorative justice,"29 but I do not see how they could
be the basis for a general theory of the relationship between law
and social norms. I will have more to say about this point in the
next two sections.
VII. CRIMINAL LAW
Mahoney spends the bulk of his comment discussing the his-
tory of criminal punishments. I agree with him that this history
is subject to multiple interpretations, but I did not find his inter-
pretation compelling.
Mahoney understands but discounts the focus of my argument
about the history of criminal sanctions, namely, that they were
often an effort to mobilize the public to sanction criminals when
the government did not have sufficient resources to impose in-
termediate punishments. One implication of this argument, as
Mahoney notes, is that the government is more likely to use
shame sanctions when the public supports it or shares its views
about the guilt of the offender and the appropriate punishment. °
Mahoney is impressed by the persistence of public executions for
two centuries despite the existence of much disorder surrounding
the executions; whereas I am impressed by its demise in response
to these concerns about disorder3' rather than humanitarian con-
cerns. Indeed, Gattrell's fashionable claim that removing execu-
29. Tracey L. Meares, Signaling, Legitimacy, and Compliance: A Comment on Posner's
Law and Social Norms and Criminal Law Policy, 36 U. RICH. L. REV. 407, 416-18 (2002).
30. Mahoney, supra note 8, at 399.
31. See id. at 400 n.37.
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tion from public view increased the suffering of condemned crimi-
nals,32 if true, would support the view that the government's con-
cern was the disorder provoked by public executions rather than
sympathy for the condemned.
The more general difference between Mahoney and me lies in
the assumption about the government. I think governments try to
exploit social norms when they can, but they also fail for the rea-
son that social norms are not easily manipulated, and the gov-
ernment often has different interests-sometimes legitimate,
sometimes not-from those who are benefited by existing social
norms. So the use of shaming punishments is a difficult busi-
ness--a point also emphasized by Meares 3--and all that history
shows is that governments' efforts to use them are understand-
able--because they are cheap-but far from perfect because of the
underlying logic of social norms. And so I have argued that the
increased use of "neutral" punishments like imprisonment was a
response to the difficulty of exploiting social norms for govern-
ment ends. Meares's point that imprisonment is not necessarily
perceived as neutral is well-taken, but that is what makes the use
of expungement laws so interesting.
Meares's endorsement of Braithewaitian "restorative justice"
assumes that the government is perceived as legitimate, or could
be if it changed its practices, and that its laws are moral. In a
world in which the interests of government and citizen were
aligned, enforcement of the law would be an easier business, and
the government could exploit social norms effectively. I am not
sure whether this description applies to the United States in
2002. Maybe it applies to some communities in the United States;
maybe it applies to some other countries such as Japan. It surely
does not apply to England of past centuries, where the class to
which the criminal law was most frequently applied had rela-
tively little influence on the content of the criminal law and the
day-to-day operation of the criminal justice system.
32. Id. at 401.
33. See generally Meares, supra note 29.
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VIII. NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS
Meares takes me to task for not "disengag[ing] [my] theory
from the standard economic conception of optimal criminal pun-
ishment," with the result that it does not "prescribe much helpful
criminal law policy where it is most needed."34 Although I agree
that the theory is too broadly gauged to generate concrete policy
prescriptions, but, like most academic theory can at best raise
alarms and suggest avenues of exploration, I want to insist that
its reliance on economic theory is a virtue, not a vice. By showing
that deterrence policies that do not take account of signaling
might have perverse effects, the theory lends nuance to the eco-
nomic view without at the same time throwing out a valuable
perspective for understanding criminal law.
By contrast, the psychological arguments endorsed by Meares
are hard to reconcile with the deterrence function of criminal law.
Even if it is true that people are more likely to comply with the
law when they believe that it is moral, or when they believe that
the government has the right to enforce the law, it is also true
that people are more likely to comply with the law when it is
backed up by large sanctions. We need some way to think about
the tradeoff between these effects: would, for example, harsher
punishments for drug crimes lead to more compliance because of
the deterrent effect of the sanctions, or less compliance because of
the illegitimacy of the sanctions (if such is the case)? Empirical
investigation could, in principle, shed light on these questions,
but a coherent theoretical approach-one that combined deter-
rence and non-deterrence considerations-would be preferable to
a collection of ad hoc insights.
Kahan points out correctly that the signaling theory might im-
ply a tax compliance strategy-publicizing the names of delin-
quents-that could backfire. Although I disagree with Kahan's
reason for thinking it would backfire (he appeals to his reciprocity
theory), I do agree that it would not necessarily succeed, albeit for
the reasons I give in chapter six of my book: that too much signal-
ing can be as bad as too little signaling. The complexity of the pol-
icy implications of the signaling theory are regrettable but un-
surprising in a complex world, and calls for careful experi-
34. Id. at 421.
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mentation by legislators and courts, and adjustment in light of
experience. As I noted above, Kahan's theory fares worse on this
score. Because his theory has more moving parts, normative im-
plications are more obscure.
Mahoney is off base if he thinks that I subscribe to a supposed
"underlying theory of social norms, which views norms as an or-
ganic social order enforced by decentralized sanctions, aided by
the light hand of a government that relies heavily on the commu-
nity to punish."35 My view of social norms is more pessimistic
than this Hayekian vision, and that is why my chapter on crimi-
nal punishments expresses skepticism about shaming penalties
rather than endorsing them.36
35. Mahoney, supra note 8, at 404.
36. I do endorse them only in the narrowest circumstances and, experimentally, for
dealing with corporations and white collar criminals. See Dan M. Kahan & Eric A. Posner,
Shaming White Collar Criminals: A Proposal for Reform of the Federal Sentencing Guide-
lines, 42 J.L. & ECON. 365 (1999).
